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THE 1975 NEW YORK, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PACKAGE:
CLASS ACTIONS AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
ADOLF HOMBURGER*
New York's recent class action and comparative negligence
legislation has more than local interest. It will be widely noted in
other jurisdictions where similar changes are under consideration.
The following discussion of the new legislation and some of its prob-
lems is based on a presentation by the author to the June 1975 Cro-
tonville Conference of New York Supreme Court Justices. The author
is the chairman of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee which
recommended the legislation.t
D uring the past year the New York Legislature enacted two bills of
vital concern to every citizen. One modernized New York's out-
dated class action procedure. The other introduced comparative negli-
gence in place of the common law rule of contributory negligence. The
changes represent the culmination of persistent efforts by the Judicial
Conference of the State of New York to bring antiquated and in-
equitable statutes and rules of the State of New York in harmony with
modern conditions. This paper reviews briefly the new legislation.
Part I deals with class actions and Part II with comparative negligence.
I. CLAss AcrIONS
On June 17, 1975, Governor Hugh L. Carey signed a bill which
adds a new Article, entitled Class Actions, to New York's Civil Practice
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and
Jurisprudence. D.U.J., University of Vienna, 1929; LL.B., University of Buffalo, 1941.
Except as otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those
of the Judicial Conference or its Advisory Committee.
t The Committee to Advise and Consult with the Judicial Conference on Civil
Practice Law and Rules, herein called "Advisory Committee," recommends improve-
ments in the area of civil procedure and related areas, conducts studies, drafts statutory
and rule changes, and evaluates legislation affecting New York's system of civil pro-
cedure. The chairman and some of the members of the Committee serve by appoint-
ment of the Chief Judge of the State of New York; others are appointed by the Pre-
siding Justices of the four appellate divisions. All members serve without compensation.
Present members are John T. Frizell, Hyman W. Gamso, Raymond W. Hackbarth,
Professor Adolf Homburger, Peter H. Kaminer, John M. Keeler, Harold A. Meriam,
Jr., John A. Murray, Maurice N. Nessen, Professor Herbert Peterfreund, George C.
Pratt and G. Robert Witmer, Jr. The Committee is assisted by William A. Bulman,
Jr., and John P. Brosnan, both serving on the legal staff of the Office of Court Admin-
istration under the Honorable Richard J. Bartlett, State Administrative Judge, and
Michael R. Juviler, Counsel. The report and recommendations of the Committee are
presented annually to the Judicial Conference which upon approval incorporates them
in its report to the Legislature on the Civil Practice Law and Rules rendered annually
pursuant to section 229 of the Judiciary Law.
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Law and Rules (CPLR).1 At the same time, the existing class actions
1. The bill added a new article 9, entitled Class Actions, comprising sections
901-06 and rules 907-09 to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, and repealed
section 1005 [hereinafter the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules will be cited
as CPLR]. See CPLR §§ 901-09 (McKinney Supp. 1976). A corrective amendment,
enacted in the same legislative session, changed the provisions of section 902. N.Y.
Snss. LAws 1975, ch. 474, discussed in note 27 infra. The new article, as amended,
reads as follows:
§ 901. Prerequisites to a class action
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether
otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interest of the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum meas-
ure or recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action,
an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.
§ 902. Order allowing class action
Within sixty days after the time to serve a responsive pleading has ex-
pired for all persons named as defendants in an action brought as a class
action, the plaintiff shall move for an order to determine whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this section may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits on the court's own motion
or on motion of the parties. The action may be maintained as a class action
only if the court finds that the prerequisites under section 901 have been
satisfied. Among the matters which the court shall consider in determining
whether the action may proceed as a class action are:
1. the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
2. the impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defend-
ing separate actions;
3. the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
4. the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litiga-
tion of the claim in the particular forum;
5. the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
§ 903. Description of class
The order permitting a class action shall describe the class. When ap-
propriate the court may limit the class to those members who do not request
exclusion from the class within a specified time after notice.
§ 904. Notice of class action
(a) In class actions brought primarily for injunctive or declaratory
relief, notice of the pendency of the action need not be given to the class
unless the court finds that notice is necessary to protect the interests of the
represented parties and that the cost of notice will not prevent the action
from going forward.
(b) In all other class actions, reasonable notice of the commencement
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statute2 was repealed. The new law, which took effect on September
of a class action shall be given to the class in such manner as the court
directs.
(c) The content of the notice shall be subject to court approval. In
determining the method by which notice is to be given, the court shall consider
I. the cost of giving notice by each method considered
II. the resources of the parties and
III. the stake of each represented member of the class, and the
likelihood that significant numbers of represented members would
desire to exclude themselves from the class or to appear individually,
which may be determined, in the court's discretion, by sending notice
to a random sample of the class.
(d) I. Preliminary determination of expenses of notification. Unless the
court orders otherwise, the plaintiff shall bear the expense of notification.
The court may, if justice requires, require that the defendant bear the expense
of notification, or may require each of them to bear a part of the expense in
proportion to the likelihood that each will prevail upon the merits. The
court may hold a preliminary hearing to determine how the costs of notice
should be apportioned.
II. Final determination. Upon termination of the action by order or
judgment, the court may, but shall not be required to, allow to the prevailing
party the expenses of notification as taxable disbursements under article
eighty-three of the civil practice law and rules.
§ 905. Judgment
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action, whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
§ 906. Actions conducted partially as class actions
When appropriate,
1. an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or
2. a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class.
The provisions of this article shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
Rule 907. Orders in conduct of class actions
In the conduct of class actions the court may make appropriate orders:
1. determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures
to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument;
2. requiring, for the protection of the members of the class, or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members
of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment,
or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, or to appear and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
3. imposing conditions on the representative parties or on inter-
venors;
4. requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly;
5. directing that a money judgment favorable to the class be
paid either in one sum, whether forthwith or within such period as
the court may fix, or in such installments as the court may specify;
6. dealing with similar procedural matters.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
1, 1975, is a modified version of a bill recommended to the Legislature
by the Judicial Conference of the State of New York.8
In a lengthy memorandum filed with the bill, the Governor called
it an "historic advance for the people of New York." He added:
The need for this legislation is obvious. The present law and its
precursors have caused extraordinary judicial confusion extending
over the past 125 years and have resulted in needlessly restricting
meaningful access to state courts for countless people.... Approval
of the bill is urged by the Office of Court Administration, by the Com-
mittee to Advise and Consult with the Judicial Conference on the
CPLR which is largely responsible for its drafting, by the Attorney
General and Lieutenant Governor, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York and the Consumer Protection Board, among others. 4
While there was enthusiastic support for the new legislation from
many quarters, one must not forget that there was also determined
opposition to portions of the bill by powerful groups. As might be
expected, the bill, in many respects, represents a compromise of
sharply conflicting interests which clashed in the Legislature. 0 It is
gratifying that the final compromise appears to be reasonable and does
The orders may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time
to time.
Rule 908. Dismissal, discontinuance or compromise
A class action shall not be dismissed, discontinued, or compromised with-
out the approval of the court. Notice of the proposed dismissal, discontinu-
ance, or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
Rule 909. Attorneys' fees
If a judgment in an action maintained as a class action is rendered in
favor of the class, the court in its discretion may award attorneys' fees to
the representatives of the class based on the reasonable value of legal services
rendered and if justice requires, allow recovery of the amount awarded from
the opponent of the class.
2. CPLR § 1005, quoted at note 17 infra. For the history of the section, see note-
6 infra.
3. S. 1309, A. 1252, 198th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1975). For a detailed discussion of the-
bill, see Thirteenth Annual Report of the Judicial Conference to the New York Legis-
lature on the Civil Practice Law and Rules, in N.Y. Sass. LAws 1975, at 1479,
1493-99 [hereinafter cited as Jud. Con!. 1975 Report]. See also N.Y. JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 204-11 (1975); N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT A 38-44 (1974); N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT A 35-42 (1973).
4. Governor's Memorandum, June 17, 1975, filed with A. 1252-B, 198th Sess.,
Reg. Sess. (1975), in N.Y. Sass. LAws 1975, at 1748.
5. These groups include, for example, The New York State Bankers Association,
and the Retail Merchants Association.
6. See CPLR §§ 901(b), 902 (first sentence), 904 (McKinney Supp. 1976), dis-
cussed infra, Indicative of the controversial nature of the legislation is the history of
the bill now enacted into law. After a first attempt to modernize New York's antiquated.
[Vol. 25
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not impair the main thrust of the bill as originally recommended by
the Judicial Conference.
In essence, class actions are a highly sophisticated pooling device
for the prosecution of numerous, similar claims when, as a practical
matter, neither individual prosecution of separate actions nor the actual
joinder of the claimants would be feasible.7 While class actions may
also be instituted when there is a class on defendants' side, the class
more frequently appears on plaintiffs' side.
On its face, the mechanics of a class action are simple. One or more
self-appointed representatives of the class sue as stand-ins for the en-
tire class, speaking for themselves and for the represented members of
the class who are similarly situated." If the class action is properly in-
stituted and prosecuted, the judgment is binding on all members of the
class, whether the judgment is favorable or unfavorable to the class.9
Although class actions deviate from traditional rules of due process
which guarantee to each litigant his day in court in person or by a rep-
resentative of his choice, the constitutionality of the device has been
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in a long line of cases
going back to 1853.10
class action statute in 1952 (see text accompanying note 52 infra), the revisers of
New York's system of civil procedure incorporated a modern class action provision in
the original version of the CPLR. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1962, ch. 308. This provision was
to become effective Sept. 1, 1963. However, prior to the effective date, the Legislature
amended the chapter and reverted to the ancient Field Code version of the class action
provision. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1962, ch. 318; see note 14 infra. Reform attempts then
rested until 1972 when two bills based on recommendations of the Judicial Conference
were introduced in the 1972 legislature. See S. 8544, A. 10448; S. 8540, A. 10455, both
195th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1972). The main bill, in substantially the same form as the
1975 bill (see note I supra), passed the Assembly, but died in committee in the
Senate. An adjunct bill, S. 8540, A. 1258, dealing with attorneys' fees (similar to newly
enacted section 909) passed neither house. The main bill was introduced again in 1973.
See S. 2024, A. 1258, 196th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1973). This time it passed the Senate,
but died in committee in the Assembly. The main bill was introduced a third time in
1974. See S. 2024, A. 1258, 197th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1974). The bill died in committee
in both the Senate and the Assembly after being amended three times.
7. See generally Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 609 (1971) [hereinafter cited as State Class Actions]. For extensive textbook
treatments of the federal class action rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1751-1804
(1972); 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, App., l 23.08-.13 (2d ed. 1975); C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (2d ed. 1970).
8. In a class action against a defendant class, the representatives of the defendant
class are also chosen by the plaintiff. See State Class Actions 610.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3); CPLR § 905 (McKinney Supp. 1976). For the
text of section 905, see note 1 supra.
10. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303
(1853) (dictum).
1976]
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In general, class actions follow the regular course of procedure in
a civil action in a court of first instance. Probably the most distinctive
,feature of class litigation is the uncommonly active role which the
judge must play in the control and supervision of the proceeding. The
public interest in the prosecution of a class action is far greater than
in ordinary civil litigation. In contrast to traditional litigation, class
actions seek adjudications which transcend the interests of the parties
before the court. It is the court's obligation to protect these broader
interests as well as the interests of the formal parties who appear in
court. The successful management of a class action, therefore, requires
an active judge, one who is willing and able to participate in the shap-
ing of the case.1 '
Class actions are not a procedural novelty. They have existed in
English equity practice since the 17th century.12 What is new is the
enhanced social significance which class actions have achieved, particu-
larly in the last decade.' 3 In New York, we have had a class action
statute since 1849.14 However, the experience under that statute, as
construed by the courts until very recently, was highly unsatisfactory."
A significant change of judicial attitude occurred in 1973 when the
state's highest court, speaking through Judge Jasen, went on record to
criticize existing restrictions on class action procedure and to urge
remedial legislation which, the court felt, was "highly preferable to
the alternative of judicial development in the same direction."'10 Fur-
ther indication of an impending break with the past, if necessary by
judicial reinterpretation of the old statute, came in 1974 when the
court, speaking through Chief Judge Breitel, upheld a class action by
a debenture owner against a debenture trustee charged with breach of
trust, gross negligence, and conflict of interest:
To the extent, if any, that the present view may appear to cx-
pand on the availability of class actions, it is emphasized again that
11. See State Class Actions 657-58; Homburger, Private Suits in the Public
Interest in the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 343, 349 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Private Suits]. (The article appears also in 68 AREXTEN ZUR RzOIrTS-
VERGLEICHUNG 9 (1975).)
12. See State Class Actions 611.
13. See id. at 640-42; Private Suits 354-55.
14. Ch. 438, § 119, [1849] Laws of New York 639, amending New York's Field
Code of 1848, chi. 379, [1848] Laws of New York 497.
15. For a detailed discussion of New York's experience under the former class
action provision, section 1005, and its antecedents, see State Class Actions 612-21;
Private Suits 655-56. See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEw YORK
CIVIL PACTICE 1 1005.02, 1005.11 (1974).
16. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554,
558, 352 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973).
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CPLR 1005, which controls, is not and has never been a rigid frame-
work. Recently, this court observed that "the restrictive interpreta-
tion in the past of GPLR 1005 and its predecessor statutes no longer
has the viability it may once have had .... -17
There is little doubt that the expresssion of judicial dissatisfaction with
the previous law provided a strong impetus for the action taken by the
Legislature in 1975.
The changes which the new law has brought about are drastic. A
hypothetical case, not wholly fictitious, may serve to contrast the old
law with the new law. Two or three years ago an embarrassing incident
occurred at the graduation exercises of the Buffalo Law School. The
students had ordered caps and gowns from a firm which rents these
garments for festive occasions. The delivery was never made; either the
post office had failed to deliver them or the supplier had shipped them
to the wrong address. At any rate, there were no caps and gowns when
the students assembled for graduation. There were disputed questions
of law and fact. Who bore the risk of non-delivery or misdelivery? The
fee, which had been prepaid by each student, was only about 12.00.
But there were hundreds of students. Somebody muttered the word
"class action." Fortunately, no action was needed since the company
voluntarily refunded the rental fees. Let us speculate, however, what
would have happened if there had been no amicable adjustment. But
for a class action, each student, individually, would have been com-
pelled to sue the company for a refund of $12.00. This, of course, would
have been impracticable. Likewise, it would have been very difficult to
arrange for actual joinder of the students who dispersed immediately
after graduation, or to procure assignments for collection of their
claims. As a practical matter, the incident probably would have re-
sulted in a windfall of thousands of dollars to the rental agency unless
a class action could have been brought.
However, under New York's old statute a class action clearly would
not have been possible. The statute required, as a prerequisite to the
maintenance of a class action, "a question of common or general inter-
est," a phrase which was construed by the courts, in a long line of cases
17. Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 35 N.Y.2d 147, 155-56, 316 N.E.2d
320, 325, 359 N.Y.S.2d 28, 35 (1974). Section 1005(a) of the CPLR, repealed in
1975, provided as follows:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons
or where the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and it
may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all.
1476]
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going back half a century, as requiring "privity."' 8 What is "privity"?
It is a vague concept of feudal origin that defies definition and anal-
ysis. It denotes a sort of legal cross-relationship between the members
of the class, a relationship that did not exist in our case. In the words
of the New York Court of Appeals taken from a much-cited case de-
cided many years ago: "Separate -wrongs to separate persons, though
committed by similar means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not
alone create a common or general interest in those who are wronged."' 9
In short, the requisite "privity" among the members of the class was
missing.
The Buffalo incident may seem trivial, but there are many other
and far more important situations where, under the old law, substan-
tive rights of large groups could not be vindicated because, as a prac-
tical matter, access to court was denied to the claimants. Deceptive and
unconscionable trade practices and diverse violations of consumer
rights, environmental offenses, civil rights cases, welfare cases and many
other types of group wrongs belong in this category. In some of these
cases, declaratory or injunctive relief, looking into the future, could be
obtained. But the only effective deterrent to future violations by way
of restitution, accounting or payment of money damages to the class
was denied in most cases. Massive wrongdoers enjoyed de facto im-
munity from prosecution. Individual relief, in view of the expense of
litigation, the complexity of the issues involved, and the size of the
individual stakes, was impracticable, and mass relief unavailable. As
the court of appeals, adhering to the notion of "privity," observed in a
case decided in 1970, the sphere of operation of class actions in New
York was restricted to "the closely associated relationships growing
out of trust, partnership or joint venture, and ownership of corporate
stock." 20
the difficulty with the privity requirement was that it failed to
respond to an overwhelming social need for a workable collective rem-
edy in situations where there is no consensual relationship between the
dispersed, unorganized and unrelated members of a class. The only
common bond that unites them frequently is the fortuitous identity
of the predicament in which they find themselves and the circum-
18. See CPLR § 1005(a) (repealed in 1975), supra note 17; State Class Actions
612-21.
19. Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292,
22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939), discussed in State Class Actions 617-19.
20. Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 259 N.E.2d 720, 722,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1970), discussed in State Class Actions 620-21.
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stance that neither individual prosecution of separate actions nor ac-
tual joinder of the members of the class is feasible, as a practical mat-
ter. The movement toward effective representation of these "diffuse"
interests is not limited to the State of New York or even the United
States. It has world-wide dimensions.21
Let us return to New York's new class action statute and review
very briefly its basic provisions.22 Section 901, subdivision (a), of the
new statute specifies in pragmatic, functional terms the prerequisites
of all class actions: (1) A definable class, so numerous that actual
joinder, otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; (2) common
questions of law or fact which predominate; (3) claims or defenses of
the representatives of the class which are typical of those of the repre-
sented members of the class; (4) fair and adequate representation of
the class interests; (5) superiority of the class action device over any
other available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.
Note the absence of any requirement of a legal cross-relationship
between the members of the class. Those familiar with the federal
rulem will also note that New York's unitary statute, while similar to
the federal model in many respects, avoids the complex classification
scheme of the federal rule. It should be rather obvious that the pre-
requisites of section 901 (a) were all met in the "cap and gown" case
mentioned above.
When we turn to subdivision (b) of section 901, we find that New
York's new statute limits significantly the sphere in which class actions
may operate. Subdivision (b) expressly prohibits the utilization of the
class action device in actions to recover a penalty or a "minimum meas-
ure of recovery," unless specifically authorized by the statute which
creates the penalty. In other words, absent express statutory authoriza-
tion, a plaintiff cannot escalate the punitive purpose of a penalty by
seeking class relief. That limitation was not contained in the original
recommendation of the Judicial Conference.2 4 It will raise Erie prob-
21. See Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest
in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MicH. L. REv. 793 (1975). See also
Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A Comparativist's
Approach (forthcoming in 25 BUFFALO L. REV. (1976)).
22. For the text of the new class action statute, see note 1 supra.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
24. The Advisory Committee was of the opinion that it should be left to the
courts to determine, in .he light of the legislative intent, whether the escalating effect
of a class action would render the use of the class action device inappropriate. See
Private Suits 376-77; cf. Ratner v. Chemical Bank, 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l
1976]
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lems, when class relief based on a state-created penalty provision is
sought in a federal court,25 and questions of applicability of federal
law in state courts when a class action is brought in the state court to
enforce a penalty originating in federal law.
2 6
Section 902 deals with the order allowing a class action. The first
sentence contains a provision that distinguishes New York's statute
from the typical class action provision found in the United States. Un-
der New York's new statute, the plaintiff, within a specified time after
commencement of a class action, must obtain leave of court to main-
tain the action in a representative capacity.27 Under previous state
practice, the defendant normally took the initiative by moving to dis-
miss the action or to strike the allegations as to the representation of
absent persons. The original draft submitted by the Judicial Conference
followed the federal practice calling for a determination whether the
Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972). To some extent, the result in Ratner and its
progeny has been altered by the recent amendments to the federal Truth in Lending
Act, which allow a class action to be maintained, but limit the total amount of damages
which may be awarded to $100,000. See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495,
tit. IV, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1518, amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
25. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Of particular significance
is Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (in diversity suit
federal court must apply state statute requiring posting of bond securing payment of
costs as a condition to prosecuting a shareholders' derivative suit). The holding was
approved in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), on the ground that non-applica-
tion of the state rule would induce forum shopping. 380 U.S. at 467. See also Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, viewing the state statute as one expected to have a sub-
stantial impact on private primary activity by deterring state suits. 380 U.S. at 475.
Similar considerations may well lead to the applicability of New York's "anti-penalty"
provisions in class actions in federal courts. Class relief under a state-created penalty
provision might be sought in a federal court in a proper case under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction even though the claim of each class member does not reach the
requisite jurisdictional amount as required in diversity cases by Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966).
26. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); see Minne-
apolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bambolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
27. Section 902, as originally enacted, provided that "within sixty days after all
answers have been filed in an action brought as a class action the plaintiff shall bring a
motion to request the court to determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
See N.Y. Sass. LAws 1975, ch. 207. This provision presented problems since in New
York, in contrast to federal practice, an action is commenced by service of a summons.
Normally, the complaint is not filed. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 3 with CPLR § 305
(McKinney Supp. 1976). A chapter-amendment corrected the error. See N.Y. Sass.
LAws 1975, ch. 474. Under amended section 902, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to move for an order allowing the class action within 60 days after expiration of the
time to serve a responsive pleading. Even that provision may create timing problems
when class relief is sought in a special proceeding. See, e.g., CPLR § 403 (b) (McKinney
1972); CPLR § 7804(c) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also CPLR §§ 103(b), 105(b)
(McKinney 1972).
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action may be maintained as a class action "as soon as practicable after
the commencement of an action brought as a class action. 28
The balance of section 902 contains important guideposts for the
exercise of judicial discretion in allowing or disallowing the mainte-
nance of a class action. The section articulates some of the factors
which may have a bearing upon the court's determination. Of particu-
lar interest are subdivisions 1, 2 and 5. Among other things, the court
should consider whether the absent members of the class have a sig-
nificant interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions, the impracticability or inefficiency of separate liti-
gation 9 and the magnitude of management problems which the court
may encounter in the progress of the litigation.
Section 903 adverts to the necessity of a definable class which
should be described in the order permitting the class action. When ap-
propriate, the court has the power to insert in the order an "opting-
out" provision, limiting the class to those members who do not re-
quest exclusion from the class within a specified time after notice. The
court might well exercise that power in a case where representation of
the entire class is not needed for a just disposition of the controversy,
the class members have a significant interest in individually controlling
the litigation, and individual notice to all members of the class is prac-
ticable. The court should realize that the insertion of an "opting-out"
provision in the order allowing the class action accentuates the need for
effective notice to the members of the class and, indeed, may give to the
notice a jurisdictional flavor.30
Section 904 contains important provisions relating to notice. The
notice scheme of the new legislation is far more elaborate and complex
than that proposed by the Judicial Conference. 31 Although the statu-
tory text is cumbersome and reveals the battle scars of a legislative tug
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1); cf. CPLR § 902 as proposed in mud. Conf. 1975
Report 1495-96.
29. The federal rule contains no express provision to that effect. See FED. R. Crv.
P. 23(b) (3); State Class Actions 636-37.
30. See State Class Actions 646, 652; cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2), which gives
the class members in an action under rule 23(b) (3) an absolute right to "opt-out."
31. The notice provision, proposed by the Judicial Conference, provided:
§ 904. Notice of Class Action
Unless the court dispenses with notice, reasonable notice of the com-
mencement of a class action shall be given to the members of the class
in such manner as the court directs. The content of the notice shall
be subject to court approval. Unless the court orders otherwise, the
plaintiff shall bear the expense of notification and be responsible
for the giving of the notice.
Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1497; see State Class Actions 652.
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of war, the added provisions are in harmony with the general intent of
the original bill and, in part, merely articulate various considerations
which were expressed in the explanatory comments accompanying the
original draft proposed by the Judicial Conference.3 2
We must distinguish between class actions primarily for injunc-
tive or declaratory relief and all others. In the former category, notice
to the absent members is not required unless the court finds it neces-
sary to protect the interests of the represented parties and the cost of
notification will not prevent the action from going forward. In the lat-
ter category, that is, in actions other than those seeking primarily in-
junctive or declaratory relief, reasonable notice of the commencement
of the action to the class "in such manner as the court directs" is man-
datory. The court is given great latitude in determining the content
and method of notification. It may consider cost factors, the financial
resources of the parties, the size of the stake of the individual class
members and the likelihood that a significant number of them may
wish to "opt-out" or appear. Notice to a random sample of the class
is expressly authorized as a means of ascertaining the pertinent data.
While normally the plaintiff bears the expense of notification, the
court has the power to shift the burden to the opponent of the class
or to apportion the expense between plaintiff and defendant on the
basis of probability of success. The court also has the power to hold a
preliminary hearing on the merits for that purpose. It will not escape
the observer that these provisions contrast sharply with the conclu-
sions reached by the federal courts in a line of restrictive decisions in-
terpreting the federal rule.33
Whatever the court does is only a tentative adjustment of the ex-
pense of notification. The final determination is made upon termina-
tion of the action. The court may, but need not necessarily allow the
expense of notification, which may be quite significant, as a taxable
disbursement. Therefore, it is possible that the class prevails, but does
not recover the expense of notification; or vice versa, that the class
loses on the merits and yet need not reimburse the defendant for that
expense.
Will the notice provisions of the new statute pass constitutional
scrutiny? The United States Supreme Court has never taken a clear
stand on the constitutional aspects of notice in class actions. Neither
32. See Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1497-98.
33. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), and the discussion
in the opinion of the court of appeals in that case addressed to the expense of notifica-
tion in the "mini-hearing," in 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Hansberry v. Lee 4 nor any of its later decisions shed much light on
that problem. In a recent encounter with the notice problem in class
actions the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin35 held that,
in the type of action involved in that case, the notice provision of the
current federal class action rule requires individual notice to all class
members who can be identified with reasonable effort.
While the holding of the Supreme Court in Eisen is firmly
grounded on the language of the federal rule, the Court went out of
its way to quote from the Notes of its Advisory Committee that "manda-
tory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) [of the federal class action
rule] . . . is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which
the class action procedure is of course subject." 36 Yet, the Court did
not draw from that quotation the conclusion that notice in the Eisen
case was a constitutional due process requirement. Content with rest-
ing its decision on the language of the rule, the Court used the Ad-
visory Committee's Notes merely to show that its narrow reading of
the rule gave effect to the intent of the draftsmen. In a footnote the
Court cautioned that the Eisen decision was not concerned with class
actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief to which the mandatory
notice provisions of the federal rule are inapplicable.3 7 It is thus quite
clear that the Supreme Court shunned a constitutional commitment
concerning the requirement of notice. There is no indication that the
Court shares the view expressed by the court of appeals in one of its
decisions dealing with the Eisen controversy that "notice is required as
a matter of due process in all representative actions .... ,,38
In order to strengthen its restrictive reading of the federal rule,
the Supreme Court also discussed briefly the notice standards, estab-
lished by the Court in two leading cases.39 However, neither of them
34. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
35. 417 U.S. at 173-74.
36. Id. at 173. Rule 23(c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as
follows:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
37. 417 U.S. at 177 n.14.
38. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968). But see
Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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was a class action. The question at issue in both cases was the quality
of notice to which persons in an adversarial posture are entitled, and
not the notice requirement as between members of a class similarly
situated.
It is submitted that the broad concept of procedural due process
should be distinguished from the narrower concept of jurisdictional
due process which, under the American doctrine, depends on an ade-
quate basis and notification reasonably calculated to apprise the de-
fendant of the suit. The strict standards of jurisdictional due process
govern when parties with conflicting interests face each other in an
adversarial contest. The relationship between members of a class with
similar interests has a different texture. It resembles the relationship be-
tween principal and agent. Notice to the members of the class is one of
many ways to assure adequate representation. It should be required
when practicable. However, the constraints of jurisdictional due process
should not be the test for constitutional clearance of class actions when
the cost of notification of each individual member of the class is pro-
hibitive, his economic stake is small, and effective protection of the
class interest is feasible by other means. 40 Viewed in that fashion, the
pragmatic and flexible notice scheme of New York's new class action
statute appears to be constitutionally sound.
Section 905 parallels section 903. The judgment, like the order
permitting the maintenance of the action, must include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The section
incorporates the familiar res judicata rule governing class actions men-
tioned above.41
Section 906 envisages class treatment of particular issues and the
creation of subclasses. Very often what looks like an unmanageable class
may be made manageable by certifying subclassess or isolating specific
issues for class treatment.
Section 907 contains a blueprint for class management. It enume-
rates various measures which the court may take in exercising its su-
pervisory function. The broad scope of the section is indicative of the
court's active role in class actions. Of special interest is the provision
contained in subdivision 5, which allows the court to mitigate harsh
economic consequences to the opponent of a class by an order direct-
ing payment of a money judgment favorable to the class in install-
ments or within such time as the court may direct.
40. See State Class Actions 643-47; Private Suits 362-63.
41. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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Dismissal, discontinuance or compromise of a class action, of course,
requires court approval and notice to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs. Rule 908 contains the applicable provi-
sions. It should be recognized that class actions pose serious and largely
unexplored and unresolved problems of professional responsibility.
Perhaps the most serious of these problems relates to the compromise
of class litigation. The lawyer who starts a class action should be ever
conscious that the class, and not only the class representative, is the
client to whom he owes loyalty.42
Finally, rule 909 contains an important provision which may pose
a serious threat to the opponent of a victorious class. The court, in its
discretion, may award attorneys' fees to the representatives of the class,
based on the reasonable value of the legal services rendered and, if jus-
tice requires, impose payment on the opponent of the class. The pro-
vision is a one-way street. If the opponent of the class wins the action,
attorneys' fees cannot be assessed against the representatives of the
class.43
Deserving brief comment is a subject which has caused heated
scholarly debate on the federal scene: the fluid recovery. Such a re-
covery is designed to deal with situations where the aggregate of the
damages inflicted upon a class is ascertainable with reasonable cer-
tainty, but distribution of the proceeds to the claimants may be diffi-
cult. They may not be identifiable, or, even if identifiable, they may
not claim their share of the recovery. Moreover, the cost of individual
notice to them may be prohibitive.
Under the fluid recovery scheme, the aggregate of damages is com-
puted and the defendant required to pay them as directed by the
court. If it is not possible to distribute the proceeds to the class as orig-
42. See Private Suits 373-75; Comment, 12 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 224 (1974);
Reports of the Conference for District Court Judges, Complex Litigation-Class Actions
and Special Cases, 65 F.R.D. 320, 323-27 (1974).
43. A similar provision was recommended by the Judicial Conference to the 1972
Legislature. See N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT A41-42
(1973). The recommendation resulted in the submission of a separate bill relating to
attorneys' fees in class actions. S. 8540, A. 1258, 195th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1972). The
bill died in committee in both houses, while the principal bill, relating to class actions,
passed the Assembly. See N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT
200 (1975). It is interesting that the attorneys' fees provision eventually was enacfed
into law although the judicial Conference recommendations to the 1973, 1974 and
1975 legislatures were limited to the principal bill. For a discussion of the provision,
as originally recommended by the Judicial Conference, see Private Suits 647-51, 654-55.
The United States Supreme Court meanwhile has sharply limited the federal courts'
authority to allow attorneys' fees to a victorious class in the absence of express statutory
authorization. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612
(1975).
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inally constituted, the recovery, under a sort of equitable cy pres doc-
trine, goes to a class that conforms as near as possible in character and
composition to the class that sustained the damages.44 New York's new
statute avoids a head-on confrontation with that thorny problem. It
neither allows nor prohibits a fluid recovery, but leaves that question
to the courts' consideration on a case-by-case basis.
There remains one question: where should judges, lawyers and
students turn for guidance in interpreting the new statute? Most of
the old law has become obsolete. However, there is a wealth of federal
materials which deserves careful study since New York's statute, in
many respects, follows the federal class action rule as revised in 1966.4r
The federal literature fills a whole library. In addition to the notes of
the federal Advisory Committee,46 there is a bewildering array of cases,
treatises,47 law review articles, symposia and student comments which
deal with the subject. Cases decided in other states which adopted the
new federal rule may also be relevant.48 Coming closer to home, there
is the author's 1971 study and draft proposal of a class action statute
for use by the states49 on which the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee to the New York Judicial Conference were based. Finally,
the 1975 Report of the Judicial Conference to the Legislature,60 which
incorporates the Advisory Committee's recommendations and resulted
in the enactment of the new statute, deserves close scrutiny. However,
in using these sources the researcher must remember that the statute,
as enacted, contains a number of provisions which deviate from the
original Judicial Conference draft and have no parallel in state or fed-
eral practice.6 '
II. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
In a second recommendation of major importance the Judicial
Conference in 1975 submitted a comparative negligence bill to the
New York Legislature. 52 The adoption of that bill was preceded in
1.
44. See Private Suits 371-73.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, as promulgated by order of the Supreme Court on
February 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1031 (1966), effective July 1, 1966.
46. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
47. For comprehensive treatment of the federal practice, see 7 & 7A C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1751-1804 (1972); 3B J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, App., I 23.08-.13 (2d ed. 1969).
48. See Private Suits 350 n.25.
49. See generally State Class Actions.
50. See Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1493-99.
51. See, e.g., CPLR §§ 902, 904 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
52. See .ud. Conf. 1975 Report 1482-92.
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1974 by the enactment of a new article 14 of the CPLRI53 which codi-
fied the fundamental rule of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 4 that there
is no longer an arbitrary requirement of a joint money judgment if
contribution is to be allowed among joint tort-feasors; nor is contribu-
tion, when allowed, frozen into a mechanistic pro rata formula.55 In-
stead, each tort-feasor who paid more than his equitable share of a
judgment is entitled to contribution in accordance with the relative
degree of culpability of all those who are subject to liability for the
same personal injury, property damage or wrongful death.I6
While the 1974 legislation gave statutory recognition to the princi-
ple of equitable apportionment of liability between joint tort-feasors
for the purpose of contribution, it did not tamper with the common
law rule of contributory negligence which governed between the'in-
jured party and the defendant. More specifically, absence of contribu-
tory negligence remained an element of a cause of action for pers6nal
injury or property damage, and contributory negligence remained an
affirmative defense to an action for wrongful death.5 7
The Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference on the CPLR
which drafted the 1974 legislation relating to contribution was fulli
aware that doctrinal consistency, logic and justice demanded the aboli-
tion of the common law rule of contributory negligence. 58 However,
the Committee felt that it would be the better part of wisdom and
53. CPLR §§ 1401-04 (MeKinney Supp. 1976).
54. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
55. See former section 1401 of the CPLR, as adopted by N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1962,
ch. 308, effective Sept. 1, 1963.
56. In addition to inserting a new article 14 in the CPLR governing contribution,
the legislation amended the General Obligations Law. See N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAw §
15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1976). The amendment removed the disincentive to settle
which existed under Dole for a wrongdoer in multi-tort-feasor situations because he
remained subject to contribution to other tort-feasors against whom a judgment in
favor of the injured party might be rendered. Under the amendment the claim of the
injured party against non-settling tort-feasors is reduced by the amount of the settlement
or by the amount of the equitable share of the damages attributable to the released
tort-feasor, whichever is greater. See N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, TWENTIETH ANNUAL
REPORT 211-27 (1975).
57. In Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 344-45, 298 N.E.2d 622, 630, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 472 (1973), the court of appeals expressly declined to extend the Dole
doctrine to the injured party, declaring that despite "full awareness that the doctrine
(of contributory negligence] was of judicial rather than legislative origin," the court
was "not prepared at this time to substitute some formula of comparative negligence."
The court felt that the topic was "more appropriate for legislative address." Florida
and California, adopting a "pure" form of comparative negligence by judicial decision,
have taken a different stance. See Nga Li v. Yellow Cab. Co. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 804;
532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973).
58. See N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 212 (1975).
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sound legislative strategy to await the enactment of the pending con-
tribution proposals and, at the same time, to oppose vigorously a com-
parative negligence bill also pending in the 1974 legislature which
would have barred recovery if the injured party was found to be more
than 50 percent negligent. 59 Such an adjustment of the rights of the
injured party would have been only one step removed from the tradi-
tional common law rule. Moreover, it would have been out of step
with the "pure" comparative negligence standards of the proposed
contribution bill. In the end, the contribution bill was enacted into
law while the "impure" comparative negligence bill was vetoed by the
Governor, largely on recommendation of the Office of Court Adminis-
tration and the negative evaluation of the Advisory Committee.00 The
time was then ripe for the completion of the statutory scheme initiated
by the 1974 contribution legislation. The Judicial Conference, on rec-
ommendation of its Advisory Committee, included the draft of a
"'pure" comparative negligence bill in its 1975 report to the Legisla-
ture.6' The bill was based on a statutory draft and accompanying study
prepared by Professor M. E. Occhialino of the Syracuse University
College of Law in collaboration with the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee. 2 After attracting sponsorship from both parties,s the bill
passed with remarkable ease and speed. The statute adds a new article
14-A, entitled "Damage Actions: Effect of Contributory Negligence
and Assumption of Risk," to the CPLRO4 and makes conforming
59. S. 10167, A. 11952, 197th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1974). Had the bill been en-
acted, New York would have joined those states which displace the common law rule
of contributory negligence only when plaintiff's contributory negligence falls below a
specified percentage in comparison to defendant's negligence. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1973) (proportional recovery permitted if plaintiff's negligence
"'was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant"); MAss. Gn.N. LAws
AN. ch. 231, § 85 (Supp. 1975) (plaintiff's negligence not to bar recovery "if such
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought"). The dramatic growth of various forms of comparative negligence in the
United States and the present state of the law throughout the country is discussed in
detail in V. E. SCHWARTz, CoasPARATrIv NEGLIGENCE 1-30 (1974).
60. See the Governor's Veto Memorandum 171, June 15, 1974 (copy retained on
file in Buffalo Law Review).
61. See Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1482-92.
62. N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SPECIAL SIX-MONTE REPORT 137-45 (1975).
63. See S. 3277, A. 4178, 198th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1975).
64. CPLR §§ 1411-13 (McKinney Supp. 1976). Under the recommendation of the
Judicial Conference, the new article would have been located in the General Obliga-
tions Law. As finally enacted, a new article 14-A was added to the CPLR. It reads
.as follows:
,§ 1411. Damages recoverable when contributory negligence or assumption
of risk is established
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property,
or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to
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changes in the Estates, Powers and Trust Law. 5 The effective date of
the new legislation was September 1, 1975.66 However, to avoid com-
plications and confusion experienced in states which shifted from one
system to the other, the new statute applies only to causes of action
accruing on or after the date of effectiveness.61 It is safe to say that
in most cases the accrual date for the purpose of applicability of the
new law will coincide with the accrual date for the purpose of the
statute of limitations.68
Several significant features of the new statute should be noted.
New article 14-A is conceptually and stylistically in harmony with
the contribution article added to the CPLR last year. Both apply in
actions to recover damages for persona injury, property damage or
wrongful death. Both are keyed to the equitable apportionment of
the decedent; including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not
bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be
diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the
claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.
§ 1412. Burden of pleading; burden of proof
Culpable conduct claimed in diminution of damages, in accordance with
section fourteen hundred eleven, shall be an affirmative defense to be pleaded
and proved by the party asserting the defense.
§ 1413. Applicability
This article .shall apply to all causes of action accruing on or after
September first, nineteen hundred seventy-five.
CPLR §§ 1411-13 (MeKinney Supp. 1976).
New York is the fourth state presently operating under a statutory "pure" com-
parative negligence system that diminishes plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of the
damages attributable to his culpable conduct, whatever that percentage may be. The
other three states are Mississippi, Rhode Island and Washington. See Miss. CoDE ANN.
§ 11-7-15 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-20-4, 9-20-4.1 (Supp. 1974); WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.22.011 (Supp. 1974). Florida and California adopted a pure compara-
tive negligence system by judicial decision. See note 57 supra. Pure comparative negli-
gence governs also under various statutes in the federal system and in foreign countries,
including England, the Canadian provinces and many civil law countries. See V.E.
ScHWARTZ, supra note 59, §§ 3.2, 3.3 & apps. A & B; Turk, Comparative Negligence
on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 304 (1950); Mole & Wilson, A Study of
Comparative Negligerce, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 337-38 (1932).
65. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-4.2, 11-3.2(b) (McKinney Supp.
1976).
66. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1975, ch. 69, § 4.
67. CPLR § 1413 (McKinney Supp. 1976); see Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1491-92;
V.E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 141-51.
68. In general, a cause of action "accrues" when all material elements of a cause
of action have come into existence. Cary v. Koerner, 200 N.Y. 253, 259, 93 N.E. 979,
982 (1910). For important recent developments in the law governing the accrual date
for the purpose of the statute of limitations, see Victorson v. Bock Laundry, 37 N.Y.2cl
395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). Problems of accrual of a cause for the
purpose of compliance with time limitations in the nature of conditions precedent are
discussed in Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e of the Generat
Municipal Law and Related Statutes (scheduled for publication in N.Y. JUDICAL CON-
FERENCE, TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1976)).
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damages among those whose culpable conduct produced the injury
and both use the same terminology.
It should be stressed that the new article governs all actions to
recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful
death,- where plaintiff's culpable conduct was a substantial factor in
producing the damages. The term "culpable conduct" which estab-
lishes the standard of comparison for apportioning damages is broad
and flexible enough to reach any breach of legal duty or fault
by the defendant, including but not limited to negligence in any de-
gree, breach of warranty, strict liability and violation of a statutory
duty.6 9
Under the new law, the assessment of damages requires a com-
parative approach. The culpable conduct attributable to the injured
party or decedent must be compared with the total culpable conduct
that caused the damages. The proportion between the two determines
the amount of damages recoverable by the injured party.7 0 In other
words, the culpable conduct of the injured party or decedent no longer
destroys the cause of action, but it diminishes the recovery propor-
tionately if it was proximately related to plaintiff's damages.71 However,
there is no change in the rule that in multiple tort-feasor situations
each joint tort-feasor remains liable jointly and severally for the total
amount of damages.2 For example, assume that plaintiff's culpability
is 20 percent, defendant's culpability 20 percent, and the culpability
of a third party who has not been sued is 60 percent. If the damages are
$10,000, the plaintiff is entitled to recover $8,000 from the party named
as defendant. That conclusion is inescapable as long as New York holds
fast to the principle of joint liability of joint tort-feasors and plain-
tiff's right to pick and choose the defendant against whom he seeks a
69. See Jud. Con!. 1975 Report 1483-84. Under the sweeping language of New
York's statute, apportionment of damages appears to be authorized even though
defendant is charged with intentional wrongdoing in rare cases where the plaintiff's
culpable conduct was a substantial factor in producing the harm. But see V.E. SOHWlARTZ,
supra note 59, § 5.3; Krause, Comparative Negligence, 47 N.Y.S.B.J. 638, 674-75
(1975). California's highest court in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal. 2d 804,
826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 852, 873 (1975), expressly excluded the
application of its judge-made comparative negligence rule where defendant acted inten-
tionally ("[A] comprehensive system of comparative negligence should allow for the
apportionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being
intentional." (footnote omitted)).
70. See Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1487.
71. See id. at 1487.
72. CPLR § 1404(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976); Gleich v. Volpe, 32 N.Y.2d 517,
523-24, 300 N.E.2d 148, 151, 346 N.Y.S.2d 806, 811 (1973); Kelly v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1972).
Barrett v. Third Ave. Ry., 45 N.Y. 628 (1871); see Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1486.
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recovery. The defendant, however, may claim contribution from the
third party for the excess paid by the defendant over and above his
equitable share of the judgment.7 -
In drafting the new statute, the Advisory Committee had to con-
sider the impact of the comparative negligence rule on the doctrines
of assumption of risk and last clear chance. The new statute sweeps
away any artificial distinction between contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. If, as some would have it, culpable assumption of
risk were a defense that relieves the defendant from his duty of care,
the policy of equitable loss distribution in accordance with the rela-
tive degree of culpability of the parties would be thwarted. It follows
that neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk should
bar a recovery. Both are factors to be taken into consideration, along
with other forms of culpable conduct of the plaintiff, for the purpose
of diminution of damages. For example, plaintiff's failure to take
reasonable precautions against a known danger should have a bearing
upon the apportionment of damages, but not upon the question of
liability.74 Since "culpable conduct" is not defined in the statute, it
will be the task of the courts to develop the concept in consonance
with the goal of equitable loss distribution.75
It should also be clear that under the new law the doctrine of
last clear chance is no longer viable. That doctrine served the useful
purpose of mitigating the harshness of the common law rule of con-
tributory negligence. In some situations, plaintiff recovered the full
amount of his damages despite his own negligence when the negligent
defendant perceived plaintiff's peril and could have prevented the
injury by the exercise of due care."6 The last clear chance doctrine thus
substituted full recovery in place of no recovery, just as the now de-
73. OPLR §§ 1401-03 (McKinney Supp. 1976). If the plaintiff in the above
hypothetical case settled with the third party for $6000, plaintiff's recovery against the
defendant would be reduced to $2000. See N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney
Supp. 1976); CPLR § 4533-b (McKinney Supp. 1976). See also N.Y. JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 212-27 (1975).
74. In Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449-50, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 920 (1974), the court of appeals, in a case of first impression, held that the non-
use of an available seat belt is a factor which the jury may consider for the purpose of
determining plaintiff's damages, but not for the purpose of resolving the issue of liability.
To reach that equitable result under the then governing rule of contributory negligence,
the court was forced to rely upon the doctrine of avoidable consequences which normally
applies to plaintiff's post-accident conduct. See C.T. MCCORMICK, DAmAGES § 33
(1935); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 422-24 (4th ed. 1971); Krause, Com-
parative Negligence, supra note 69, at 638, 641, 672.
75. See Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1486.
76. Id. at 27-29.
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funct primary-secondary tort-feasor doctrine substituted complete shift-
ing of loss in place of the common law rule of no contribution between
joint tort-feasors. These were judicial palliatives which are no longer
needed. Under the doctrine of comparative fault, defendant's last clear
chance, to prevent injury to the plaintiff simply becomes one of the
factors which the fact-finder should consider in fixing the relative de-
grees of culpability.
Two final observations should be made before concluding this
brief discussion of the new comparative negligence rule. One pertains
to the questions of pleading and burden of proof. Under New York's
version of the common law doctrine of contributory negligence, the
plaintiff normally was required to plead and prove lack of contributory
negligence as one of the elements of his cause of action.7 Under the
new law, following the vast majority of American states, contributory
negligence becomes a partial affirmative defense to be pleaded and
proved by the defendant in diminution of damages78
The second problem to which attention should be drawn did not
exist under the prior law, but will arise frequently under the new law.
Assume an automobile accident in which both drivers sustain serious
personal injuries. Plaintiff suffered $50,000 damages and defendant
counterclaims for $100,000 damages. The relative culpability of each
party, we will assume, is 50 percent. Plaintiff, therefore, under the doc-
trine of comparative negligence, would be entitled to recover $25,000
and defendant $50,000. Normally, in that situation, only a single judg-
ment would be entered. By setting off plaintiff's recovery of $25,000
against defendant's recovery of $50,000, a net judgment for the de-
fendant against the plaintiff in the amount of $25,000 on the counter-
claim would result.79
How will liability insurance companies fare under the new
scheme? Under the old law, in the above hypothetical case, the insur-
ance carriers' exposure would have been zero. Since both parties were
negligent, there could be no liability. Under the new law, if the in-
77. Rossman v. La Grega, 28 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 270 N.E.2d 313, 314-15, 321
N.Y.S.2d 588 (1971); Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 135 N.E.2d 708, 153 N.Y.S.2d
197 (1956); see L. FRUMmER, 0. WARREN, J O'CONNEL & M. ADELMAN, BENDER'S
Fo~aas FOR THE Criv PRicTiO 30-581 (Form No. 3013:115, Official Form No. 12)
(1974); Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1490. In actions for wrongful death the opposite rule
applied. Contributory negligence of the decedent was a defense to be pleaded and proved
by the defendant. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTs LAW §§ 5-4.2, 11-3.2(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
78. CPLR § 1412 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
79. CPLR § 3019(d) (McKinney 1974); see 3 J. WEINSTEiN, H. KORN & A.
MILLER, NEW Yox CIvW PRACTicE 3019.02 (1973); Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1488-89.
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surance company could take advantage of the set-off, defendant's in-
surer would pay nothing and plaintiff's insurer could discharge its ob-
ligation to its insured by paying to the defendant $25,000. Obviously,
that result would be utterly unfair. It would mean, in effect, that the
liability insurance company would discharge its obligation out of the
pockets of the insured. In fairness, there should be no set-off. Each
party is entitled to receive the full amount of his own damages and
have his liability, to the extent that he is covered by insurance, dis-
charged by his insurer. In other words, in our hypothetical plaintiff's
insurer should pay $50,000 to the defendant, and defendant's insurer
should pay $25,000 to the plaintiff. After careful deliberation, the
Advisory Committee considered it most unlikely that any court would
hold otherwise and, for that reason alone, refrained from including in
its draft a specific provision prohibiting the insurer from applying
the insured's recovery as a set-off in reduction of its obligation. The
Advisory Committee's comment, as incorporated in the recommenda-
tion of the Judicial Conference, states expressly: "It is the intent of
this proposed legislation that no casualty insurance company, or other
insurer, shall apply as a set-off to payment pursuant to a policy of in-
surance any amount by which a recovery against its insured was dimin-
ished by reason of a counterclaim or cross-claim asserted by the in-
sured pursuant to this article."80
From the insurance companies' point of view, the net result will
be that in our hypothetical their combined exposure has jumped from
zero under the old law to $75,000 under the new law. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the insurance companies will gain
nothing under the new scheme and that, in the end, the insured's
premiums will rise. There are compensating advantages which the in-
surer will reap under the new system. It is an open secret that jurors
have often disregarded the common law rule of contributory negli-
gence. Sometimes they have reduced plaintiff's recovery rather than
allow no recovery. At other times, when plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was minor, they have disregarded it entirely and have assessed
full damages against the defendant. Under the 'new law, that will proba-
bly not happen. Jurors will be more inclined to mete out justice in
accordance with the law. The benefits gained by the insurance com-
panies in their cumulative effect might well more than offset the
loss.
The possibility that both plaintiff and defendant, asserting claim
80. Jud. Conf. 1975 Report 1489.
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and counterclaim against each other, may recover judgments which
their insurance carriers must discharge, may have curious consequences.
A plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence may be better off
than one who is free of fault since a judgment against him on the
counterclaim produces a fund that can be used to satisfy an otherwise
uncollectible judgment. For example, assume in the above hypothetical
case that plaintiff carries $50,000 insurance while the impecunious
defendant has only $10,000 minimum coverage. If plaintiff was not
negligent, a judgment of $50,000 in plaintiff's favor would be uncol-
lectible to the extent that it exceeds defendant's insurance limits. On
the other hand, if the relative culpability of each party were 50 per-
cent, the plaintiff would have recovered only $25,000 but could have
satisfied the judgment out of defendant's recovery on the counterclaim.
As a practical matter, plaintiff would have preferred a collectible judg-
ment for $25,000 to a judgment for $50,000, four-fifths of which cannot
be collected.
The suggestion has been made that the situation described above
might involve counsel provided by the insurance carrier in a serious
conflict of interest. Assume that plaintiff, after a finding by the jury
that both parties were equally culpable, instructs his lawyer "to take
it easy" when defendant proves his damages. Plaintiff who knows that
his insurance policy fully covers him will not be averse to creating
an asset that assures satisfaction of his judgment.
It would seem that the "assistance and cooperation clause" of the
liability insurance policy and the Code of Professional Responsibility
provide adequate answers to the question raised. Plaintiff's devious
purpose under the assumed facts would be to fabricate a claim against
himself in order to create a fund out of which he can satisfy a judg-
ment at the expense of his insurance carrier. If a lawyer were to par-
ticipate in such a scheme he would violate his professional responsi-
bility."' Moreover, the insurer might withdraw from the defense and
claim a forfeiture of insurance coverage if the insured persisted in his
refusal to minimize the damages for which the insurer is ultimately
liable.8 2
81. ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT DR 7-102(A) (6) & EC 7-26 (1974).
82. See Seltzer v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 N.Y. 330, 169 N.E. 403 (1929); Cole-
man v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 275-77, 160 N.E. 367, 368-69 (1928);
Mangano v. Sunbright Steam Laundry Co., 248 App. Div. 731, 289 N.Y.S. 831 (2d
Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 642, 8 N.E.2d 34 (1937).
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POSTSCRIPT
The new class action legislation is a source of great personal
satisfaction to me. I became keenly aware of the need for a workable,
but controlled and fairly balanced group remedy more than two decades
ago when, under commission of the Judicial Council of the State of
New York, I prepared the first draft of a functional class action statute,
freed from antiquated notions of privity. The bill now enacted into
law, at long last, fills that need. It compensates, in part at least, for the
hostility to class actions mirrored in a line of decisions which sharply
diminish the utility of federal class actions and shut the doors of the
federal courts to small claimants' class suits in diversity cases.83
With respect to comparative negligence, the Legislature in the
past two years abandoned its long-standing resistance to a reform of
basic notions of loss distribution in tort law.84 The initial effort was
made in 1974 when the Legislature codified, clarified and refined a
judge-made rule permitting apportionment of responsibility among
joint tort-feasors in accordance with the relative degree of culpability.
In 1975, in a crowning effort, the Legislature finally restored balance
and consistency to the newly emerging system of loss distribution by
adopting a rule of comparative negligence that is in harmony with
the law of contribution.
83. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Socy, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
84. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150-51, 282 N.E.2d 288,
293-94, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 389-90 (1972).
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